A Non-Causal Explanation of Behavior in Radical Behaviorism

Abstract

The objective of this essay was to examine the possibility of a non-causal explanation of behavior in the Radical Behaviorism perspective. We began describing the essential components of a causal thought, namely: conditionality; uniqueness; necessary connection; one-sided dependence; and genetic connection. It is argued that with exception of the conditionality, Radical Behaviorism rejects all the other components. Thus, the defense of a non-causal interpretation of the radical behaviorist explicative model becomes reasonable. Then, we present a proposal of non-causal explanation of behavior, based on functional interdependence relations among events, states and processes. From this proposal on, to explain is not synonymous of search for the causes of the behavior anymore; to explain is identified with the description of the functioning of the behavioral stream. It is concluded that supposed ambiguities found in Skinnerian texts with respect to the explanation of behavior can be surpassed by: 1) discarding both logic and causality’s vocabulary; and 2) adopting a dynamic explanation of behavior.