Mentalism and behavior explanation: aspects of the radical behaviorist criticism of cognitive science

Abstract

This article aims to evaluate the importance of radical behavioral criticism to mentalism in cognitive science. After being introduced, the criticism is related to the radical behavioral conception of causality. The main focus is on why radical behaviorism is immune to possible problems of mentalism and why mentalism might result in such problems. The next step begins with the evidence that cognitive science is mentalistic because it is the science of internal events. However, being mentalistic would not necessarily imply uncritical acceptance of the problems pointed by Skinner, what is verified by the presentation of the historical development concerning cognitive science. The conclusion reached is that each and every behavioral criticism has become and obstacle in cognitive science, which means that the problems of mentalism are seen as problems for cognitive science as well. Two consequences emerge from that fact: the first one is the impossibility of criticizing cognitive science for its mentalistic feature; the second is that, when dealing with those problems, cognitive science, specially the unfolding of the embodied and situated cognition, ended up defending position that is similar to the one supported by radical behaviorism.