Some aspects of a Skinnerian espistemology

Abstract

Some Skinnerian options about sciencie are first presented: pragmatism in cience and the study of the scientists behavior; the technical aspects of science, with respect to the control and prediction of behavior; the formulation and function of scientific laws. Then, among these topics, two basic lines are shown of interest: Skinner´s view of causality, and his conceptions about explanation and scientific theories. Some recent studies (Chiesa, 1994; Ringen, 1999: Smith, 1986) have examined these two aspects of Skinnerian radical behaviorism. The present work review their arguments, in each case, before concluding on two remarks: firstly, considering the two last centuries, theoretical background of the Skinnerian determinism is not a mechanistic one; behavior is often globally considered, but operant mechanism seems also to operate at a molecular level; a temporal gap remains between  behavior and consequence, not always explicitly justified; the equivalence between description and explanation might be discussed; and the rejection of certain forms of theories is not uniquely logical. All these points can lead to different philosophical positions. The lack of originality or inaccuracy of some Skinnerian options implies to pursue further investigations, in order to defend the building of a proper Skinnerian radical behaviorist epistemology. We propose to support this temporary conclusion by future research.