Relendo B.F. Skinner e aprendendo com ele

Abstract

During its history, radical behaviorism (understood as the perspective for Psychology developed by B.F. Skinner) has been challenged by a series of problems -diversified and with different amplitudes- which comprehend from the explanatory system's internal coherence to its possibilities to explain satisfactorily the human behavior. It may be mentioned, for example, questions about the requirement of observability of treated phenomena leading to a discussions about nonons such as subjectivity and consciousness and its place within radical behaviorism, and questions related to the analytic units used in the description of the phenomena leading to a discussion of the possibilities to explain complex human behavior. These problems have been seen in different forms: they can be seen as reflecting a misinterpretation or an incomplete understanding of the explanatory system itself, or as reflecting gaps or imperfections in this system. In any case, this author believes that the vitality of this explanatory system directly depends on how these problems are or will be faced. The point of view supported in this paper is mar the examination of the initial period of elaboration of skinnerian's explanatory system (1930-1938) can offer conditions to localize the sources of some of these problems and to discern the possibilities and the limits to overcome them within the boundaries of this explanatory system. The analysis of part of B.F. Skinner's work published between 1930-1938 suggests many aspects that seem to be related to the dilemmas which the skinnerian explanatory system will have to face in the continuity of ns elaboration process. Two of these aspects are pointed here: the development of the concept to drive and the concept of reflex strength. In the early publications of the period considered, Skinner does a vigorous defence of the concept of reflex as the concept that would permit the construction of a science of behavior. Over the course of this same period, however, the concept of operant takes this place, and a concept which seems fundamental in this transition reflex-operant is the concept of ref1ex strength. It is maintained even when Skinner comes lo utilize the concept of operant. The concept of ref1ex strength seems to be specially necessary to deal with concepts that raise problems related to the observability requirement, as drive for instance.
It is discussed : a) if the concept of reflex strength allows to meet the observability requirement, and b) the analytic unit enclosed in the concept of reflex strength as this concept is referred to reflex and as it is referred to operants, and its implications.