Cognitive psychology and knowing other minds
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Abstract
Cognitive Psicology has assumed that knowing other minds as an extension process by analogy or generalization of one ´s own mind. This conception plays a central role in the explanation of language development and communication, and it is epistemologically based upon the assumption of an original language in first person and on introspection as self-knowledge. I propose several arguments that point out that these assumptions are untenable and, hence, that knowing other minds from the knowledge of one´s own mind is impossible.
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